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Perhaps somewhat less surprising, given the skill of our editors, the 
two essays touching most directly on the ontological argument fi t well 
together and into the volume as a whole, and they provide a substan-
tive discussion of Anselm’s most famous proof. Brian Left ow in “Anselm’s 
perfect-being theology” summarizes Anselm’s project: “Roughly speak-
ing, Anselm is trying to fi nd descriptions that apply to God and would 
still have described Him even if only He existed” (p. 134), in contrast, for 
example, with the notion of God as Creator. Left ow provides an impor-
tant clarifi cation about why Anselm approaches questions of God in the 
way that he does and thus prepares us to engage rightly in the ontological 
argument. Brian Davies’s essay on that argument (“Anselm and the onto-
logical argument”) is, as one would expect, a model of clarity. 
Aft er complimenting the editors for great success at what is surely a dif-
fi cult task—bringing together a coherent but broad and varied volume on 
a thinker such as Anselm—it may seem a bit nit-picky to complain about a 
single infelicitous phrase in the Introduction. But perhaps the emphasis will 
highlight what the editors have accomplished. Davies and Left ow write in 
the Introduction that Anselm can be taken as a philosopher insofar as we 
understand a philosopher as “someone concerned to argue for conclusions 
in a cogent way” (p. 2). Surely Anselm was concerned to argue and do so 
cogently, but, as numerous essays in the volume show well, such thin ide-
als do not capture the depth and richness of Anselm’s own vision of what 
theoretical and philosophical activity is about. The volume makes clear 
that Anselm is a passionate thinker, convinced that truth is transformative 
and that refl ection on fundamental issues, especially God and the soul, is 
part of piety to God. To focus on the cogency of the arguments without 
also att ending to the quality and att itude of the soul making the arguments 
and the transformative nature of the topics studied, is to construe what 
it means to be a rational, reasoning human being in a way quite diﬀ erent 
from how Anselm would. Theoretical refl ection is about seeking truth, but 
truth for Anselm is not something that can be divided into parts. There are 
not many truths, but one truth. Thus the pursuit of truth does not involve 
a limited aspect of oneself (e.g., certain cognitive faculties) but includes the 
full transformation of the person. It is a vision foreign to modern ears but 
rich with resources—which makes this volume all the more welcome. 
Duns Scotus on God, by Richard Cross. Ashgate Studies in the History of 
Philosophical Theology, Ashgate Publishing Limited: Aldershot, 2005. 
289 pages.
JOHN KRONEN, The University of St. Thomas, St. Paul
This is a well researched, well writt en, and well argued book on an impor-
tant topic. Cross has succeeded admirably in a diﬃ  cult task—explaining 
enough of Scotus’s complex philosophy to allow those unfamiliar with 
either Scotus’s thought or medieval philosophy in general to follow, rea-
sonably well, the arguments Scotus oﬀ ers on a range of diﬃ  cult questions 
in natural and philosophical theology. 
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Leaving aside the introduction, which gives a biographical sketch of 
Scotus and describes the intellectual context in which he wrote, as well as 
the appendix, which deals with Scotus’s theory of the conditions for the 
possibility of theological discourse, the book is divided into two parts. Part 
I, consisting of eight chapters, deals with Scotus’s natural theology; Part 
II, consisting of ten chapters, deals with that part of Scotus’s philosophical 
theology which defends and explicates the doctrine of the Trinity. 
The fi rst chapter of the book explicates Scotus’s causal theory. In it 
Cross helpfully notes that medieval causal theories, unlike contemporary 
ones, focus on the intuitive idea that a cause is somehow the source of its 
eﬀ ect—it gives being to its eﬀ ect in some way. Cross notes that many me-
dieval thinkers, such as Thomas Aquinas, tried to account for this aspect 
of causality with respect to eﬃ  cient causes by insisting that such causes 
somehow pre-contain their eﬀ ects. Aft er noting this aspect of medieval 
theories of causation, Cross does not spend too much time explicating it, 
focusing instead on the scholastic notion that causality can be understood 
in terms of potency and act. The idea here is that a cause C must have 
active powers that are able to produce a certain eﬀ ect in something E by 
actualizing E’s capacity to receive such an eﬀ ect. In this place Cross (who 
had already identifi ed form with “essential structure”) says that medieval 
talk “of substantial forms is at root a way of taking about the essential 
properties, powers, and capacities of a thing; talk of accidental forms is a 
root way of talking about contingent properties, powers, and capacities 
of a thing”(p. 18). Though this adds important content to Cross’s earlier 
identifi cation of form with “essential structure,” it is misleading. For most 
of the medievals, a form was not a set of necessary properties, but the root 
of such properties. Indeed, the essential properties of things were taken 
by the medievals to be necessary accidents of them which, by a “natural 
emanation,” resulted from their forms. 
Having briefl y discussed the general theory of causality adopted by the 
scholastics, Cross devotes a great deal of space in chapter 1 to a discussion 
of Scotus’s account of the distinction between essentially ordered causal 
series and accidentally ordered ones. The basic diﬀ erence between these 
two kinds of series is that, in the fi rst kind, but not the second, the later 
members of the series depend, in their very causing, on the causality of the 
earlier members. Scotus emphasizes three other diﬀ erences between these 
kinds of causal series. The fi rst of these is that in an essentially ordered 
causal series the earlier members of the series cause in a diﬀ erent and higher 
way than the later members do, the second of these is that in an essentially 
ordered causal series the earlier members act simultaneously to cause the 
eﬀ ects of the later members of the series, and the third is that in an essen-
tially ordered causal series there can be no infi nite causal regress. Cross 
discusses Scotus’s arguments for each of these diﬀ erences, fi nding the fi rst 
two lacking in empirical support and questionable in light of modern sci-
ence. But, as he notes, the most important of the secondary diﬀ erences 
between essentially ordered and accidentally ordered causal series is that 
in an essentially ordered causal series there can be no infi nite regress. Sco-
tus gives several arguments for this claim and Cross fi nds some of them 
considerably more powerful than others. He notes here that Scotus antici-
pated Leibniz by insisting that, even if there could be essentially ordered 
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causal series which have an infi nite number of members, there would have 
to be some cause of the entire series which lies “outside” of it. This type 
of argument is oft en accused of committ ing the fallacy of composition but 
Cross, like William Rowe, thinks it does not, if one assumes a robust ver-
sion of the principle of suﬃ  cient reason. 
Aft er discussing the nature of essentially ordered causal series as ap-
plied to eﬃ  cient causes, Cross goes on to note that Scotus held that there 
are essentially ordered causal series other than eﬃ  cient ones since, follow-
ing Aristotle, he recognized material, formal, and fi nal causes as well as 
eﬃ  cient ones. Of these, the most important are fi nal causes, where a fi nal 
cause is that on account of which something is done. Scotus, following 
Aristotle, held that every eﬃ  cient cause acts for the sake of an end, and 
also that the end for the sake of which it acts must be more perfect than the 
eﬀ ect its produces. The last of these claims is an important one for Scotus 
since it is especially by reference to fi nal causality that he tries to establish 
the perfection and value of the fi rst cause of all caused things and, in so 
doing, tries to further establish that the fi rst cause is divine. 
In the second chapter of the book, Cross explains several of Scotus’s 
proofs for God’s existence, spending the most time on what he calls Sco-
tus’s “modal proof.” That proof begins with the assumption that it is pos-
sible that something produced exist, or, to put it another way, it is possible 
that there be a produced thing. Aft er putt ing forth the proposition that it 
is possible that there be a produced thing, Scotus goes on to assert that, if 
that is the case, it is possible that there be something productive of such a 
thing. The claim is obviously non-analytic, but I take it that Scotus would 
hold that it is self-evident (even if not analytic in the contemporary sense) 
that if it is possible that some contingent thing exist then it is possible that 
something exist that could produce it. This is so because any contingent 
thing (anything that does not have being from itself) must have being 
from another. Continuing on with the argument, Scotus holds that, if it is 
possible that some producible thing exist, then it is possible that a series 
of essentially ordered eﬃ  cient causes exist. This is so because every caus-
ally ordered series is either essentially or accidentally ordered and every 
accidentally ordered series is dependent, in some way, on an essentially 
ordered causal series. As already noted, Scotus gave several arguments 
for the conclusion that a regression to infi nity is impossible in essentially 
ordered causal series. Since this is so, Scotus reasons that any possible es-
sentially ordered causal series must terminate in a fi rst uncaused cause, 
with the result that the very possibility of an essentially ordered causal 
series entails the possibility of an uncaused fi rst cause of such a series. 
However, the very possibility of an uncaused fi rst cause of an essentially 
ordered causal series entails the actuality of such a cause. If it is possible 
that an uncaused cause exists it is possible that something exists which is inde-
pendent and necessary in its being and nothing, either intrinsic to the nature 
of such a being, or extrinsic to it, could block the possibility of its being 
actual from being realized. 
Scotus’s modal proof shares some similarities with St. Anselm’s onto-
logical proof, particularly in its argument that the very possibility that 
a necessary and independent being exist entails the existence of such a 
being. However, as Cross notes, the proof is diﬀ erent from Anselm’s in 
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that it does not begin with the possibility of there being a “being than 
which none greater can be conceived” but rather with the possibility of 
their being a produced being. Cross does not think that “much can be 
done to salvage Scotus’s [modal] argument” (p. 38) since he thinks it rests, 
ultimately, on a claim that is empirical in nature. We could not know that 
it is possible that there be producible beings absent our experience of be-
ings that are produced. But, even if that is true, it does not seem to me to 
aﬀ ect the modal nature of the claim that it is possible that some producible 
thing exist. To suppose it does would seem to confl ate the epistemic with 
the ontic. 
Scotus not only gave a modal argument for God’s existence; he also 
gave a more traditional cosmological argument that seems to me more 
powerful than any of Aquinas’s. Cross briefl y discusses this argument be-
fore rounding oﬀ  this chapter by considering Scotus’s arguments for the 
conclusions that (1) some nature able to be a simply fi rst goal of activity 
exists, (2) some simply most perfect nature exists, and (3) no more than 
one nature has necessary existence of itself. Cross argues that Scotus’s at-
tempted proof of (2) does not work since, even if every premise of it is 
true, it does not entail (2) but the much weaker claim that “some nature 
more perfect any other existing nature exists.”
Having explicated Scotus’s proofs for God’s existence in chapter 2 of 
Part I, Cross devotes the remaining chapters of Part I to Scotus’s discussion 
of the divine att ributes. In chapter 3 he outlines Scotus’s general approach 
to the divine att ributes--an approach which, at least in certain of Scotus’s 
works, departs fairly radically from the method of several of his predeces-
sors. It was common, as Cross points out, for many medieval thinkers to 
follow the method of St. Anselm in discussing the divine att ributes. Hav-
ing proven (in some way) that a single, most perfect being exists, they 
att empted to fl esh out the att ributes of such a being by predicating of it 
formally, but in the highest degree, all those att ributes found in creatures 
which do not, intrinsically, involve any imperfection (e.g. wisdom, power) 
even if they involve imperfection as existing in creatures. Scotus expressed 
grave misgivings about this method of treating the divine att ributes since 
he thought that, in order to know whether or not a certain att ribute intrin-
sically involves an imperfection, one would fi rst have to know whether 
or not such an att ribute in fact belongs to the most perfect being! Hence, 
in treating the divine att ributes, Scotus followed another method which 
was also used, at least in part, by other scholastics and thinkers of later 
periods. That method is to determine what att ributes the fi rst being must 
have in order to be the ultimate eﬃ  cient and fi nal cause of the world. 
For Scotus these seem to consist essentially in volition and knowledge. Of 
course, the fi rst cause will be infi nitely free, infi nitely knowing etc., as well 
as being simply, eternally, immutably, and so on, such things. But Scotus 
holds that such att ributes as infi nite are modes of God that are not on the 
same footing as such att ributes as knowledge. Knowing that God is infi nite, 
simple, eternal, and so on does not enable us to know anything about what 
God is so much as it enables us to know that, whatever he is, he is infi nitely, 
simply, eternally and so on. 
Scotus’s theory of the non-modal att ributes of God (viz. volition and 
knowledge) are discussed in great detail by Cross in chapter 4. This is 
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one of the most diﬃ  cult chapters in the book and I think Cross does an 
excellent job of illuminating some of Scotus’s most subtle arguments in it. 
The most extensive section of the chapter deals with God’s knowledge. As 
explicated by Cross it would appear that Scotus wished to put forward an 
account of the divine ideas (i.e. God’s ideas of the kinds of created things) 
that was mid-way, as it were, between Aquinas’ theory, according to which 
such ideas are reducible to God’s knowledge of the various ways he is able 
to be imitated, and Malbranche’s theory of the divine ideas, which appears 
to put forward the notion that God, in some way, thinks the eternal essence 
of things into existence. I can’t say that Cross has convinced me that Scotus 
succeeded in this project—at the end of the day his doctrine (at least with 
respect to God’s knowledge of kinds of created things if not with respect 
to God’s knowledge of individual created things) does not seem all that 
diﬀ erent from Aquinas’. Scotus’s account of the non-modal att ributes of 
God appears to me to be impoverished in comparison with that of certain 
other theologians since, if what Cross says is representative of Scotus’s 
treatment of them, he did not devote much att ention to God’s moral at-
tributes (e.g. justice, holiness, love, mercy, truthfulness, etc.). Perhaps this 
is due to Scotus’s voluntarism which lead him to embrace the divine com-
mand theory, at least with respect to the second tablet of the law. Cross 
does briefl y discuss this aspect of Scotus’s thought, but does not spend 
much time on it except to note that, for Scotus, it is a corollary of God’s 
perfection and transcendence. 
Chapters 5-8 are devoted to explicating Scotus’s views and arguments 
concerning such modal att ributes of God as infi nity, simplicity, timeless-
ness, omnipresence, unicity, and immutability. Cross emphasizes that Sco-
tus gives pride of place, among these, to God’s infi nity, holding that it 
is the modal att ribute of God’s we fi rst arrive at through reasoning and 
that it can be used to give arguments for God’s other modal att ributes. 
Another key feature of Scotus’s doctrine of God’s modal att ributes is the 
use he makes of his original theory of the formal distinction in his discus-
sion of God’s simplicity. The basic idea of the formal distinction is that it 
is mid-way between a purely conceptual and a real distinction. We think, 
truly, according to Scotus, that Socrates is both a human and an animal, 
but we also truly think that some non-humans are animals. If both these 
beliefs are true, then that in virtue of which Socrates is a human must 
not be formally the same as that in virtue of which he is an animal, since 
if it were, then whatever is an animal would be a human. In short, if two 
att ributes are not co-extensive, then one is not, formally, the same as the 
other—there is something more than a merely conceptual distinction be-
tween them. However, the humanity of Socrates cannot exist without his 
animality, and vice versa, so the two, while being more than merely con-
ceptually distinct, are not really distinct in Socrates.
Though, according to Scouts, Socrates’ animality is not really distinct 
from his humanity, his wisdom is, since Socrates might not have been 
wise and could lose his wisdom. In addition to the distinction between 
Socrates’ animality and humanity, and between him and his accidents, 
Scotus, in some places at least, holds that Socrates’ essence (like every cre-
ated essence) exists in a suppositum (subject) that is somehow distinct from 
Socrates, though Cross thinks that Scotus’s doctrine of what a suppositum 
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is to be much thinner than Aquinas’. Furthermore, he holds that, accord-
ing to Scotus, God has no suppositum at all and that all of God’s att ributes 
are, at most, only formally distinct from each other and from God. It is in 
this way that Scotus sought to maintain the doctrine of the divine simplic-
ity, while yet allowing that the divine att ributes are more then merely con-
ceptually distinct. Cross explains that Scotus felt he had to hold that the 
divine att ributes are more than merely conceptually distinct since holding 
that they are merely conceptually distinct would make Theology impos-
sible. It should be noted, though, that Sctotus’ denial of any suppositum in 
which the divine essence exists seems to undercut his own explanation 
of how the divine essence is common to the three persons of the Trinity, 
something that Cross discusses at length in chapter 13.
Part II of the book, running from chapter 9 through chapter 18, gives 
a marvelously detailed discussion of Scotus’s complex theory of the Trin-
ity, ranging from his highly original twists on an old argument for the 
doctrine the God is triune, through his account of what it is to be a divine 
person, his att empt to make coherent the view that the divine essence is 
an individual essence which exists, undividedly, in three distinct persons, 
his account of the personal properties, and his account of how the Son and 
Holy Spirit are produced in a way that gives due prominence to the real 
causality of Father and the Son without positing any undue subordination 
of the Son and the Holy Spirit to the Father or of the Holy Spirit to both. In 
this part of the book Cross well supports his claim that Scotus’s treatment 
of the doctrine of the Trinity is very rich and oﬀ ers many insights on how 
to expound the doctrine in a coherent way that is free from logical con-
tradiction. Nevertheless, I do not think he has shown that Scotus oﬀ ers a 
way out of the apparent inconsistency of holding (as Scotus and countless 
medieval theologians did) that 1) the divine essence is simple and exists, 
undivided, in the three persons of the Trinity, 2) each person of the Trinity 
is wholly constituted by the divine essence, and 3) each person of the Trin-
ity is really distinct from every other person of the Trinity. 
All in all this is an excellent book. Cross is liberal in providing the read-
er with well chosen passages from Scotus’s works and his discussion of 
these passages is always illuminating even if, here and there, one might 
reasonably question certain of his interpretations. I would highly recom-
mend it to anyone interested in medieval philosophy, or in natural and 
philosophical theology.
Aquinas’s Summa: Background, Structure, & Reception, by Jean-Pierre Torrell, 
O.P., translated by Benedict M. Guevin, O.S.B. The Catholic University of 
America Press, 2005. Pp. x + 156. $17.95 (paper). 
TODD C. REAM AND THOMAS W. SEAT II, Indiana Wesleyan University 
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